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WHO ARE MY REAL MOMMY AND DADDY? THIRD-PARTY
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS AND THE NEED FOR
LEGISLATIVE GUIDANCE IN NORTH DAKOTA WITH THIS
POLICY-LADEN AREA OF LAW
ABSTRACT
Children are increasingly being raised by persons other than their
biological or adoptive parents. When disputes arise between parents and
third parties seeking custody, there are many of the traditional child custody
dynamics at play, but also some unique ones. North Dakota has judicially
crafted the means and standards by which a third party may petition for
custody of a child. Due to the highly sensitive nature of assigning rights
and responsibilities with regard to the care of children, the North Dakota
Legislative Assembly should give the courts of North Dakota statutory
guidance on how third parties can gain custody of a minor child. By using
the experiences of other states and the American Law Institute’s guidance
on the subject, the Legislature should craft law that will aid trial and
appellate courts in this highly sensitive area.

236

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:235

I.

INTRODUCTION....................................................................... 237

II.

PARENTING IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT ......................... 238
A. MEYER AND PIERCE MAKE THE FIRST FORAY INTO
PARENTAL RIGHTS ............................................................... 238
B. THE INTEREST OF PARENTS BECOMES A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT, OR IS IT A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST?...... 240
C. TROXEL SAYS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, BUT DOES THE
SUPREME COURT REALLY MEAN IT? .................................. 243

III.

NORTH DAKOTA’S THIRD PARTY CHILD
CUSTODY LAWS ..................................................................... 247
A. SOME RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES ARE STATUTORY............ 248
1. Grandparent Visitation .................................................. 248
2. Aunt, Uncle, and Grandparent Temporary
Custody Pending Adoption and
Domestic Violence Placement ........................................ 249
B. MOST CLAIMS OF THIRD PARTIES TO CUSTODY ARE
JUDICIALLY CREATED.......................................................... 249
1. Grandparental Custody Actions Not Based on
Statutory Authority ......................................................... 250
2. Stepparents Can Petition for Custody if They Are
Psychological Parents .................................................... 251
3. Other Exceptional Circumstance Cases ......................... 251

IV.

A PROPOSED STATUTE TO CLARIFY NORTH
DAKOTA’S THIRD PARTY CUSTODY LAW ....................... 252
A. ASPECTS OF NORTH DAKOTA’S LAW THAT
NEED CLARIFICATION .......................................................... 253
B. OTHER STATES’ STATUTORY SOLUTIONS ........................... 257
1. Minnesota’s Third Party Custody Statute ...................... 257
2. California’s Third Party Custody Statute ...................... 258
C. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES ...................... 259
D. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSSIBLE SOLUTION ............................. 260
1. North Dakota’s Standing Solution by Defining
Parenthood for Child Custody Actions .......................... 260

2012]

NOTE

237

2. The Need to Insulate Parents from Marginal
Third Party Claims ......................................................... 260
3. The Third Party Should Need to Prove His or Her
Case by Clear and Convincing Evidence ....................... 261
4. A Third Party Granted Only Visitation Must
Show that Visitation Will Not Interfere with
the Parent-Child Relationship ........................................ 262
V.

I.

CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 264

INTRODUCTION

Despite past notions of family, a significant number of children in the
United States are not living with both of their biological parents.1 The
incidence of children living in households with an adult who is not that
child’s biological parent is also significant.2 North Dakota is not immune
from the phenomenon of children being raised by persons other than their
biological parents.3 When parents seek to regain custody of their children
from third parties that had been raising the children, it is not a
straightforward decision as to whether the parent should regain the custody
of his or her child.4 The extent to which the third party remains in the
child’s life is also often disputed.5 The law surrounding these types of
claims is anything but certain, and North Dakota statutes provide little
guidance.6

1. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILY AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2011,
tbl.C9 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2011/tabC1all.xls (showing only sixty-nine percent of children in United States are living with both parents).
2. See id. (showing 8.3% of children in the United States live in a household with at least one
stepparent, grandparent, or other non-parent, excluding adoptive parents).
3. KAREN OLSON, N.D. KIDS COUNT, NORTH DAKOTA KIDS COUNT 2011 FACT BOOK 11
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ndkidscount.org/factbook/completefactbook/NDKCFact
Book_2011.pdf (noting that four percent of children in North Dakota live with a grandparent
alone, and that only seventy-two percent of North Dakota children live with both parents).
4. See McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 31, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662-64 (Crothers, J.,
concurring) (surveying North Dakota cases on the subject).
5. See id.
6. North Dakota has specific language applying to custody that was adopted in 2009. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-00.1 (2009). Rather than using those definitions, throughout this Note,
the term custody will be used, referring to physical custody, now known in North Dakota as
primary residential responsibility, and visitation will be used, which is now known as parenting
time. See id. §§ 14-09-00.1(5)-(6), 14-09-33. The use of the term custody for third parties is
intentional, in part, for the reason set forth later concerning standing. See discussion infra Part
IV.A.
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This Note reviews the United States Supreme Court precedent
articulating the constitutional rights that parents have at stake in any
proceeding between a parent and a third party, reviews the statutory law and
case law in North Dakota concerning third party custody claims in North
Dakota, and draws upon other states’ experiences and the American Law
Institute’s guidance on providing a clear statute to guide both litigants and
courts in making determinations that are both fair to parents and beneficial
to children.
II. PARENTING IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Parents have a constitutional right to the care and custody of their
children.7 The history, refinement, and current questionable status of
parental rights are analyzed in this section. Part A looks at the Supreme
Court’s early articulation of parental rights. Part B examines at the
Supreme Court’s refinement of parental rights over time. Finally, Part C
analyzes the Supreme Court’s most recent case on parental rights and shows
that things are not quite as clear as many people once thought.
A. MEYER AND PIERCE MAKE THE FIRST FORAY INTO
PARENTAL RIGHTS
The Supreme Court’s first recognition of the fundamental nature of
parental rights occurred in 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,8 in response to a
question regarding the education of children.9 In Meyer, a parochial school
teacher was found guilty of violating a Nebraska statute, which criminalized
teaching a student in a language other than English.10 The teacher
challenged the prohibition as a violation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.11 The Nebraska Supreme Court defended the
prohibition on security and pedagogical concerns of the state, and found the
restriction on teaching foreign languages a proper exercise of police power
and not a violation of due process.12
The United States Supreme Court reversed Meyer’s conviction,
holding the criminal statute was applied arbitrarily and did not have a
reasonable relation to a proper state interest.13 The Court found the liberty
interests of the teacher were implicated in such a prohibition, but more
7. E.g., McAllister, ¶ 14, 779 N.W.2d at 658.
8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 397.
12. Id. at 397-99 (quoting Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100, 102 (Neb. 1923)).
13. Id. at 403.
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importantly, that the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment includes
the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” and “the power
of parents to control the education of their own.”14 The Court did not rely
solely on the basis of the parents’ “essential” rights to control the education
of their children, but also on the right of a modern language teacher to
practice his occupation, and of citizens to speak languages other than
English.15 Thus, while not a case squarely dealing with a parent’s rights,
Meyer stands as the first pronouncement that a parent’s authority over a
child is one of the “fundamental rights which must be respected” under the
Fourteenth Amendment.16
The Supreme Court readdressed the issue of parental rights in an
educational context two years later in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary.17 In Pierce, the Supreme Court held
parents cannot be forced to send their children to a public, as opposed to a
private or parochial, school.18 In 1922, the voters of Oregon passed the
Compulsory Education Act, which made failure to send a child between age
eight and sixteen to a public school a misdemeanor for any parent or
custodian of that child.19 Both a Catholic school system, the Society of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary (“Society of Sisters”), and a
military academy, Hill Military Academy, sought an injunction against
enforcement of the Act, as it would irreparably destroy their business,
having no student enrollment.20 Although no parents were parties to the
suits, the Society of Sisters did run an orphanage, and would have fallen
under the Act’s prohibition as custodian of children.21 Unlike the Court in
Meyer, the Pierce Court squarely placed its holding on the implication of
parents’ right to control their children.22 The Court wrote “the Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control.”23 The Court
focused on parental rights despite being invited by the Society of Sisters to
14. Id. at 399, 401.
15. See id. at 401-03.
16. Id. at 401; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1012-16 (1992) (noting that the
litigants and the state courts focused on claims of religious freedom and freedom of educators to
practice their occupation, not primarily on the rights of parents to direct the education of their
children).
17. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
18. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
19. Id. at 530-31.
20. Id. at 531-33.
21. See id. at 532.
22. Id. at 534-35.
23. Id.
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invalidate the Act on the other interests implicated in Meyer.24 The most
lasting impact of Pierce has been the idea that the child is not primarily
identified with the state, but rather, the family.25 The Court wrote “[t]he
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.”26
B. THE INTEREST OF PARENTS BECOMES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT,
OR IS IT A FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST?
The rights of parents concerning their children were readdressed by the
Supreme Court in 1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts.27 In Prince, a
Jehovah’s Witness was convicted of violating child labor laws when she
took her niece, whom was in the aunt’s custody, on a street mission
distributing copies of religious periodicals.28 The aunt challenged her
conviction as being a violation of her rights to direct the upbringing of the
child in her custody, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and of
the child’s religious freedoms, as guaranteed by the First Amendment.29
The Court acknowledged parents have priority in the “custody, care and
nurture of the child” and there is a “private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.”30 Despite reaffirming the fundamental right of parents
to control their children, the Court acknowledged there are limits to this
power when the public interest and the protection of children necessitate
intervention.31 The Court ultimately upheld the conviction, finding the
protection of children from the harms of preaching on a public street are of
such a magnitude that the state was within its constitutional bounds to
entirely prohibit such activity.32
In 1968, the Court again upheld a challenge to the constitutionality of a
criminal statute, attacked in part on parental rights grounds, in Ginsberg v.
New York.33 The owner and operator of a Long Island store and deli
24. See id. at 532 (noting the Society of Sisters complaint urged enjoinment of the Act on the
basis of children’s rights to direct their own education and teachers to practice their occupation, in
addition to parents’ rights to direct the education of their children).
25. See Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 997-98.
26. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. See generally Woodhouse, supra note 16, for a scholarly
argument that Meyer and Pierce are based on very conservative notions that children are the
property of their parents.
27. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159-60.
29. Id. at 164.
30. Id. at 166.
31. Id. at 166-67.
32. See id. at 170.
33. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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challenged his conviction under a state statute for selling an obscene
magazine to a child, despite such magazine having been adjudicated to not
be obscene for adults.34 Ginsberg argued, implicitly, the prohibition on
such sales violates parents’ freedom to choose what materials their children
can read.35 The Court rejected this argument, thus reinforcing the state’s
role in protecting children from harms.36 The Court noted the New York
Legislature used a rational law to advance this interest.37 The Court went
even further and found the prohibition on sales of obscene materials to
children enhanced parents’ control over their children’s upbringing.38
Having moved away from parents’ interests as a priority in the 1940s to
1960s, the Court reasserted a concern for parents as opposed to state
interests in Stanley v. Illinois.39 In Stanley, the Supreme Court held a state
cannot presume a father who is not married to his children’s mother should
not have custody of his children when the mother dies.40 The Court, citing
Meyer and Prince, found a father’s “interest in retaining custody of his
children is cognizable and substantial.”41 The Court did not dispute that
Illinois has a legitimate interest in ensuring children are cared for by fit
parents, but the presumption that unwed fathers are unfit was not
reasonable.42
In the same year it decided Stanley, the Court reaffirmed parents’ rights
to control his or her children’s upbringing, no matter how different from
mainstream society, in Wisconsin v. Yoder.43 In Yoder, several Amish
parents challenged their convictions of violating a Wisconsin statute
34. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631-34. The magazine that Ginsberg sold to the minor was a copy
of Sir. Id. at 634 n.3. This same magazine was challenged as being obscene generally, and in a
per curium opinion, the Supreme Court rejected such a finding. Id. (citing Redrup v. New York,
386 U.S. 767 (1967)). In Redrup, a consolidated case, the Supreme Court reversed an Arkansas
injunction in an in rem proceeding against the distribution of certain magazines, including Sir.
Redrup, 386 U.S. at 769-70.
35. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638-39. Ginsberg’s main argument was that minors’ First
Amendment rights were being violated since the material was not obscene when adults were
concerned, and there could not be two standards of obscenity, one for adults and another for
minors. See id. at 636-37. He also challenged the prohibition as being void because it was so
vague that it does not give a possible violator fair warning as to what the statute prohibits. Id. at
643.
36. Id. at 640-41.
37. Id. at 643.
38. See id. at 639 (noting this law support’s parents in ensuring children’s well-being and
that parents can always choose to give the materials to their children, if the parent so decides).
39. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
40. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
41. Id. at 652.
42. See id. at 352-53 (“We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals
when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the
State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family.”).
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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requiring attendance of children under sixteen in either a public or private
school.44 The challengers believed sending their children, who were
graduates of the eighth grade but not yet sixteen years old, to high school,
would lead to damnation and violated their religious tenants.45 With regard
to the rights of parents to control their children, the Court noted the
educational choices made for children were for parents to decide, and, when
there is a religious nature to the decision, it comes to be a “fundamental
interest of parents.”46 The Court in Yoder articulated a higher standard of
review for statutes tending to implicate parents’ religious choices for their
children, but did not give a clear standard of what review is required.47
The right of parents to the care and control of their children was
recognized of requiring special procedural requirements in a parental rights
termination proceeding in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services48 and
Santosky v. Kramer.49 In Lassiter, the Court held a state was not required to
provide an indigent parent appointed counsel in every instance, but in many
instances, due process would require appointment of counsel, and trial
judges should make such determination.50 In a stronger ruling than
Lassiter, the Court in Santosky held a clear and convincing evidence burden
of persuasion for the state was mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause in a parental rights termination proceeding.51 Since
both of these decisions were about procedural rules concerning parental
rights, they were not subjected to a rational basis, or other type of scrutiny
used for substantive due process challenges, but rather, a balancing of
interests test.52 Despite being focused on procedure, Santosky is probably
44. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-09.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 214, 232.
47. See id. at 233 (noting the statute at issue in Prince was upheld for being reasonable but
“when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed
by this record, more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State’ is required”).
48. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
49. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
50. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
51. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
52. Id. at 754, 758 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Lassiter, 452 U.S.
at 27). In Eldridge, the Supreme Court reviewed a claimed violation of due process when the
Social Security Administration’s procedures permitted termination of disability benefits prior to
an evidentiary hearing. 424 U.S. at 349. In evaluating a state’s chosen procedure,
specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
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the strongest-worded articulation of parents’ substantive rights, describing
them as a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child.”53
The articulation of parental rights as fundamental is significant because
fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.54 The standard requires the government
to have a compelling interest for the action chosen, and its action must be
narrowly tailored to implement that interest.55 Other rights not considered
fundamental are subject to rational basis review, where the government
only needs a legitimate interest and its actions only need to be rationally
related to that interest.56 The determination of whether a right is really
fundamental, and therefore the correct level of constitutional scrutiny to be
applied, is key because the outcome of the case often depends on what level
of scrutiny a court will use.57
C. TROXEL SAYS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, BUT DOES THE SUPREME
COURT REALLY MEAN IT?
The Supreme Court’s most recent consideration of a claimed violation
of a parent’s rights over her children came in the year 2000, in Troxel v.
Granville.58 There was no majority opinion issued in Granville, with a
plurality opinion, two concurrences, and three dissents filed.59 The case
involved a challenge to a Washington statute that provided a right for any
person to petition the court for visitation with a child at any time, and
required the court to order visitation if it would be in the best interest of the
child.60 The dispute arose out of grandparents seeking court ordered
visitation with their grandchildren after their former daughter-in-law

Id. at 335.
53. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
54. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
55. Id.
56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
57. See David B. Howlett, Illegitimate Children and Military Benefits, 132 MIL. L. REV. 5,
17 (1991). At one point Justice Marshal endorsed a view of strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.” Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Subsequent Courts have disavowed using this view as analysis. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 326 (2003). While not a use for analysis, the phrase still has descriptive weight.
58. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
59. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 59.
60. Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994)). The statute provided “[a]ny
person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody
proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the
best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.” WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3).
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curtailed visitation following her ex-husband’s suicide.61 The state trial
court awarded the grandparents visitation, the mother appealed, and
eventually the Washington Supreme Court held the statute violated the
United States Constitution, because it did not require a showing of harm to
the child if visitation was not ordered; the statute was also found to be
overbroad because there were no restrictions on who could petition for
visitation.62
Justice O’Connor authored the plurality opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Ginsberg and Breyer joined.63 The plurality
described “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children [as] perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”64 However, the plurality was not consistent in
its terminology, later in the opinion calling this interest a “fundamental
right” of parents.65 The plurality upheld the Washington Supreme Court’s
decision because the statute was “breathtakingly broad” and gave no weight
to the decision of a fit parent.66 The plurality endorsed two presumptions
concerning parental rights: first, that a parent is fit until shown otherwise,
and second, that a fit parent acts in his or her child’s best interests.67
Significantly, the plurality specifically declined to hold, as the Washington
Supreme Court had, the Due Process Clause requires a showing of harm, or
potential harm, to the child prior to a third party being granted visitation. 68
The plurality did not want to create a “per se” rule for third party visitation
“[b]ecause much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a caseby-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental
visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.”69
Thus, it is not clear what test – rational basis, strict scrutiny, or some
intermediate – the plurality applied to invalidate this statute.70
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment affirming the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision, but wrote separately because he argued the

61. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61.
62. Id. at 63 (citing In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28-31 (Wash. 1998) (en banc)). In
re Custody of Smith was a consolidated case involving three separate constitutional challenges to
the Washington statute. 969 P.2d at 23.
63. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 65.
65. Id. at 66.
66. Id. at 67.
67. See id. at 68-69.
68. Id. at 73.
69. Id.
70. See id. (“We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due
process right in the visitation context.”).
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plurality justices went too far by analyzing the actual facts of the case. 71
Justice Souter noted the Washington Supreme Court held the visitation
statute invalid on its face, and not in its application to any facts, finding the
plurality’s factual analysis to be problematic “in the ‘treacherous field’ of
substantive due process.”72 Despite this difference in approach, Justice
Souter essentially found the same overbreadth problem, and, like the
plurality, specifically declined to decide whether a showing of harm to the
child is required to allow the state to infringe upon the parent-child
relationship.73 Notably, Justice Souter did not use the word fundamental to
describe a parent’s interest in controlling their children, and specifically
noted the parental interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is not
clearly defined.74
Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment, but would have
invalidated the visitation statute as a violation of due process under the
Court’s current due process precedent.75 Justice Thomas had the clearest
articulation of the parental right at stake.76 He argued the right is
fundamental, and as such, strict scrutiny applies to reviewing an
infringement of that right.77 Despite Justice Thomas arguing strict scrutiny
was the appropriate measure, he would have invalidated the statute if either
rational basis review or strict scrutiny were applied, noting “the State of
Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest – to say nothing
of a compelling one – in second-guessing a fit parent’s decision regarding
visitation with third parties.”78
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy all filed dissenting opinions.79
Justice Stevens would have denied certiorari in the first instance, but having
decided the merits, would not have invalidated the statute on a facial
challenge, since all applications of the statute would not be
unconstitutional.80 Justice Stevens argued the typical case would likely be
someone with a close relationship with the child seeking visitation and thus
is not sufficient to hold a statute facially invalid.81 Further, Justice Stevens
71. Id. at 75-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id. at 76-77.
74. Id. at 77, 78-79.
75. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas would hold that there are not
unenumerated rights that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but recognizes that under
the Court’s current due process analysis, this statute violates the Constitution. See id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 80, 91, 93.
80. Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 85.
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argued a showing of harm has never been required to limit parental rights.82
He also did not agree with the plurality’s presumption that a fit parent acts
in the best interests of his or her children.83 Finally, Justice Stevens
questioned how the constitutional rights of children should be weighed
against the decisions that parents make concerning the child.84 Justice
Stevens also called the interest of parents “a fundamental liberty interest in
caring for and guiding their children.”85 However, he did not apply strict
scrutiny analysis, and only limited his holding to the argument that the
statute cannot be facially invalid.86
Justice Scalia’s dissent generally attacked the idea of unenumerated
rights under the Due Process Clause.87 He also noted the due process rights
of parents were articulated in an era of substantive due process that has long
been repudiated.88 Justice Scalia argued the definition of a “parent” can be
slippery, and federal courts should avoid excursions into family law, which
is the proper province of state legislatures.89
Finally, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the holding of the Washington
Supreme Court that a finding of harm must always be made in order for a
third party to be granted visitation with a child over a parent’s objection.90
He noted the best interest standard for visitation disputes has a long history
and tradition as the basis for decision.91 Finding that being free from an
application of the best interest standard in all third party custody cases is
not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Justice Kennedy would not
have held the Washington statute facially unconstitutional.92 This basis
alone would have been sufficient for Justice Kennedy to remand the case to
the Washington Supreme Court for a decision on the application of the
statute to these facts.93
Given the Supreme Court’s precedent concerning parental rights, there
is no clear answer as to the scope and nature of the right, nor whether
82. Id. at 85-86.
83. See id. at 89 (“The constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with
parental rights should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the
arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of
the child.”).
84. Id. at 89.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 90-91.
87. Id. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 92 (citing West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
89. Id. at 92-93.
90. Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 99.
92. Id. at 100.
93. Id. at 95, 101-02.
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parental rights really are fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny.94 One
commentator has noted that prior to Troxel, the nature of parental rights as
fundamental, and subject to strict scrutiny, was firmly established, but
following Troxel parental rights are not as firm.95 The majority of Justices
in Troxel rejected applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the statute, and
rather pointed towards a balancing of interests type of standard, which is
wholly inconsistent with the Court’s prior approach to fundamental rights.96
Thus, following Troxel, there is a good argument the proper standard for
evaluating parental rights is a balancing of interests, and not an application
of strict scrutiny.97
The confusion of where parental rights fit within the Court’s
constitutional precedent has prompted some in Congress to propose an
amendment to the Constitution to provide “the liberty of parents to direct
the upbringing and education of their children is a fundamental right” that
can only be infringed when the government can show that its “interest as
applied to the person is of the highest order and not otherwise served.”98
The Court has also recently declined an invitation to clarify the two open
questions left after Troxel.99 The Court was asked to determine (1) whether
parental rights are fundamental and (2) whether a third party visitation
statute has a showing of harm requirement.100
III. NORTH DAKOTA’S THIRD PARTY CHILD CUSTODY LAWS
North Dakota is in the minority of jurisdictions that recognize the
placement of custody in a third party absent statutory authority.101 Many
state courts have explicitly rejected awarding custody to a non-parent over a
parent’s objection without some statutory authority to do so.102 This section
first describes the areas where North Dakota has some statutory guidance,

94. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of
Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 985-92 (1987) (questioning whether parental rights really
are fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny).
95. David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1132-33, 1152-55 (2001).
96. Id. at 1152-55.
97. Id.
98. H.R.J. Res. 97, 110th Cong. (2008). The same amendment has been proposed in each
subsequent Congress. H.R.J. Res. 3, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 42, 111th Cong. (2009).
99. E.R.G. v. E.H.G., 123 S. Ct. 1535 (2012) (No. 11-311) (denying certiorari).
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, E.R.G. v. E.H.G., 123 S. Ct. 1535 (2012) (No. 11311), 2011 WL 4048829.
101. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 32, 779 N.W.2d 652, 664 (Crothers, J.,
concurring).
102. Id. ¶ 34, 779 N.W.2d at 665.
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and then reviews some of the North Dakota case law developing a third
party’s right to claim custody.
A. SOME RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES ARE STATUTORY
North Dakota’s laws on child custody are predominantly statutory.103
Part 1 discusses the statutory rights grandparents have with regard to
visitation in North Dakota. Part 2 discusses other more ephemeral statutory
rights that third parties have with regard to custody and visitation in North
Dakota.
1.

Grandparent Visitation

Grandparents and great-grandparents can petition for visitation with an
unmarried minor child.104 To award visitation, the district court must find
that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and not interfere
with the parent-child relationship.105 North Dakota’s grandparent visitation
statute is basically the same as was originally enacted in 1983,106 but it has
not always been that way.
In 1993, the Legislative Assembly significantly revised North Dakota’s
grandparent visitation statute to provide a presumption that visitation is in
the child’s best interests, and visitation will be denied only when it is shown
to not be in the child’s best interests.107 In Hoff v. Berg,108 the North
Dakota Supreme Court held this presumption was an infringement of due
process.109 After reviewing the nature of parental rights, in both North
Dakota and other jurisdictions, the court determined that controlling whom
one’s child associates with is a parents’ fundamental right, and is to be
reviewed under strict scrutiny.110 The court held the statute violated both
the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions, because of the
presumption in favor of visitation and the burden was on the parents to
show visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship.111 The
finding that parental interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children is a fundamental right under the state constitution is significant

103. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-09 (2009).
104. Id. § 14-09-05.1(4).
105. Id. § 14-09-05.1(1). The best interest factors the court must consider are codified. Id. §
14-09-06.2.
106. Compare 1983 N.D. Laws 486, with 2009 N.D. Laws 610-11.
107. 1993 N.D. Laws 619.
108. 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285.
109. Hoff, ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92.
110. Id., ¶¶ 14-17, 595 N.W.2d at 290-91.
111. Id. ¶ 18, 595 N.W.2d at 291-92.

2012]

NOTE

249

because “[t]he North Dakota Constitution may afford broader individual
rights than those granted under its federal counterpart.”112 Thus, despite the
apparent erosion of parental rights as “fundamental” in Troxel,113 the North
Dakota Supreme Court has reaffirmed that under the North Dakota
Constitution parental rights are fundamental rights.114 The status of strict
scrutiny being applied to this fundamental right, however, is unclear
because the North Dakota Supreme Court has not addressed the question
since Hoff.
2.

Aunt, Uncle, and Grandparent Temporary Custody Pending
Adoption and Domestic Violence Placement

North Dakota statutory law also provides for the placement of custody
with different family members pending an adoption.115
All other
assignments of parental rights by a parent without court order are void.116
Third-party custody is also authorized when it is necessary to protect the
welfare of a child that has been exposed to serious domestic violence.117
Again, there is a preference, though not a requirement, that this third party
be a suitable relative of the child.118
B. MOST CLAIMS OF THIRD PARTIES TO CUSTODY ARE
JUDICIALLY CREATED
North Dakota recognizes that when exceptional circumstances are
present, a third party can make a claim for custody of a child,
notwithstanding the constitutional claims that a parent has to the child.119
The exceptional circumstances justify granting the third party custody is to
prevent harm to the child.120 Exceptional circumstances have been
recognized in three different cases: claims by grandparent-caregivers,
claims by stepparents, and claims by voluntarily appointed guardians.121

112. State v. Mittleider, 2011 ND 242, ¶ 16, 809 N.W.2d 303, 308.
113. See discussion supra Part II.C.
114. Hartlieb v. Simes, 2009 ND 205, ¶ 20, 776 N.W.2d 217, 224. The erosion of this right
might not be recognized by the North Dakota Supreme Court. See id. (citing Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000)) (“It is undisputed that parents have a fundamental right to the custody
and control of their children.”).
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-10-05 (2009).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 14-09-06.2(1)(j).
118. Id.
119. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 14, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658.
120. Id.
121. See discussion infra Part III.B.1-3.

250

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
1.

[VOL. 88:235

Grandparental Custody Actions Not Based on
Statutory Authority

Many of the cases in North Dakota regarding the placement of custody
with a third party, over a parent’s objection, involved grandparents who had
taken the responsibility to care for their grandchildren with the consent of at
least one of the parents.122 In McKay v. Mitzel,123 a father petitioned for
custody of his children following the death of his ex-wife.124 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed granting custody to the maternal
grandparents, finding this arrangement to be in the best interests of the
children because the grandparents had provided care for the children in the
grandparents’ home, and the children preferred to remain there.125
In a similar case, the North Dakota Supreme Court granted
grandparents custody of their grandson, in large part because the
grandparents had formed a strong bond with their grandson during the
father’s absence.126 The North Dakota Supreme Court held the proper
standard was the best interest of the child, and continuity in the child’s
custody would best serve him.127 The court recognize the grandfather was
the only “father” this child had ever known.128 The court took note of
recent literature on the best interests of the child, and found the
grandparents were the child’s “psychological parents”: the person who has
shared memories with and who the child feels valued by.129 Accordingly,
the court reversed the trial court’s award of custody to the boy’s father, and
restored it to the grandparents.130 Throughout the cases in North Dakota
involving third party claims for custody, a vast majority involve
grandparents seeking the custody of their grandchildren following a
parent’s absence or death.131

122. See McAllister, ¶ 31, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662-63 (Crothers, J., concurring).
123. 137 N.W.2d 792 (N.D. 1965).
124. McKay, 137 N.W.2d at 793. At the time the procedure was to file a writ of habeas
corpus to have the child’s custody determined when the parent who had physical and legal custody
had died. Id. at 793-94.
125. Id. at 793-95.
126. In re Custody of D.G., 246 N.W.2d 892, 893-94 (N.D. 1976).
127. Id. at 895. The court did not discuss any constitutional issues with this standard. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973)).
130. Id. at 895-96.
131. See McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 31, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662-63 (Crothers, J,
concurring) (surveying cases).
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Stepparents Can Petition for Custody if They Are
Psychological Parents

Another occurrence where claims of a third party arise is when a
stepparent claims custody over a child’s biological parent. In Worden v.
Worden,132 the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the award of custody
of a stepdaughter to her stepfather in a divorce between the mother and
stepfather.133 The district court had found exceptional circumstances
justified awarding the stepfather custody, because the mother’s life was
unstable and the child’s biological father did not visit her.134 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed, finding there was no evidence the
stepfather had become the psychological parent of the child given the short
time the couple was married, only two years, developing such a bond was
unlikely.135 The court noted “each case in which such a placement has been
upheld by this court has involved a child who has been in the actual
physical custody of the third party for a sufficient period of time to develop
a psychological parent relationship with that third party.”136 In In re
Guardianship and Conservatorship of Nelson,137 a stepparent figure was
awarded custody, despite never having been married to the child’s father.138
Most recently, the same doctrine that has been used to award custody of a
stepchild to a stepparent has been invoked to allow a court to order
visitation when there is a psychological parent relationship, despite custody
not being found to be in the best interests of the child.139
3.

Other Exceptional Circumstance Cases

The only other area where the North Dakota Supreme Court has found
an exceptional circumstance warranting a custody award in someone other
than a natural or adoptive parent is when a parent voluntarily places his or
her child into a guardianship with another person. In In re Guardianship of

132. 434 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1989).
133. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 341-43.
134. Id. at 342.
135. Id. at 343.
136. Id. at 342-43.
137. 519 N.W.2d 15 (N.D. 1994).
138. In re Nelson, 519 N.W.2d at 19-20. The petitioner in Nelson was the live-in girlfriend
of the child’s father. Id. at 16. They had been living together for four years, including the father’s
two children from a previous marriage and the girlfriend’s three children from a previous
relationship. Id. Over this time the girlfriend did not work, but rather provided the daily care for
all of the couple’s children. Id. The guardianship became necessary because the father had died.
Id.
139. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶¶ 16, 20, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658-60; Edwards v.
Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶¶ 10-11, 777 N.W.2d 606, 609-10.
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Barros,140 the North Dakota Supreme Court held a voluntarily created
guardianship is, as a matter of law, an exceptional circumstance permitting
the district court to begin with a best interest analysis when the parent seeks
to terminate the guardianship and the guardian opposes termination.141 The
majority held the proper standard for the removal of a guardianship of a
minor is that the parent initially prove by a preponderance of the evidence
the reasons justifying the guardianship in the first place are no longer
valid.142 Once this has been shown, the guardian opposing the termination
must show continuation of the guardianship is in the best interests of the
child.143 The court specifically rejected the application of a clear and
convincing evidence standard to the best interest analysis, because the
parental rights had not been fully infringed upon with the creation, and
possible continuation, of the guardianship.144
Justice Kapsner dissented from the court’s holding that a
preponderance burden is the appropriate measure for continuing a
guardianship against a parent’s wishes.145 Justice Kapsner believed a
suspension of parental rights, which appointment of and continuation of a
guardianship accomplishes, is more akin to a termination of parental rights
and, as such, would apply a clear and convincing evidence standard.146 In a
subsequent case involving the same issue, Justice Kapsner did not dispute
that a preponderance standard was appropriate for the best interest
analysis.147
IV. A PROPOSED STATUTE TO CLARIFY NORTH DAKOTA’S
THIRD PARTY CUSTODY LAW
North Dakota has a strong preference for setting policy through the
Legislative Assembly rather than through the court system.148 North
Dakota judges and justices also prefer to not set policy, but rather defer to
elected officials where possible.149 This Part looks at particular issues that
are calling for legislative attention in North Dakota. Part A shows where
some ambiguity lies in current North Dakota third party custody law. Part
140. 2005 ND 122, 701 N.W.2d 402.
141. In re Barros, ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d at 409.
142. Id. ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d at 408.
143. Id.
144. See id. ¶¶ 16-19.
145. Id. ¶ 26, 701 N.W.2d at 410 (Kapsner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. ¶ 28, 701 N.W.2d at 411.
147. Hartleib v. Simes, 2009 ND 205, ¶¶ 21-22, 48, 776 N.W.2d 217, 224, 231.
148. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 01-02-01 (2008).
149. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 35, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, J.,
concurring).
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B looks at other states’ legislative approaches to third party custody. Part C
analyzes the American Law Institute’s approach to third party custody.
Finally, Part D makes some suggestions on how North Dakota could
approach some of the issues in its current third party custody law via
legislation.
A. ASPECTS OF NORTH DAKOTA’S LAW THAT NEED CLARIFICATION
There are several aspects to North Dakota’s judicially crafted law
surrounding third party custody claims that is unclear and could benefit
from statutory guidance. First, as shown by the disagreement between the
majority and the dissent in In re Barros, the question of the appropriate
burden of persuasion is a significant issue when the government is using its
authority to contravene the wishes of a fit parent.150 Though the North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled the burden on the third party is a
preponderance of the evidence when the best interests of the child are being
determined, there is also another burden of persuasion issue at play in thirdparty custody cases.151 The third party must show there are exceptional
circumstances that justify a best interest analysis, and under current case
law, this burden is by a preponderance of the evidence.152
Second, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated preventing harm
to the child is a predicate to awarding custody to a third party, but it is not
clear whether the concern for harm is to be evaluated in determining if
exceptional circumstances exist, or when considering the best interests of
the child.153 In McAllister v. McAllister,154 the North Dakota Supreme
Court wrote that the exceptional circumstances were only a predicate to
conducting the best interest analysis when the prevention of harm to the
child was to be evaluated.155 In Edwards v. Edwards,156 the North Dakota
Supreme Court held granting visitation with a stepfather was appropriate

150. See In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶¶ 13-18, 701 N.W.2d at 407-09; id. ¶¶ 26-28, 701
N.W.2d at 410-11 (Kapsner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
151. See, e.g., Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, ¶ 9, 610 N.W.2d 758, 761; see also
McAllister, ¶ 37, 779 N.W.2d at 666 (Crothers, J., concurring).
152. Hamers, ¶ 9, 610 N.W.2d at 761; McAllister, ¶ 37, 779 N.W.2d at 666.
153. See Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶ 11, 777 N.W.2d 606, 610.
154. 2010 ND 40, 779 N.W.2d 652.
155. See McAllister, ¶ 15, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (“Establishment of a psychological parent
relationship does not end the trial court’s inquiry in making a custody decision, but merely
furnishes a justification for the award of custody to a party other than the natural parent. . . . [T]he
natural parent's paramount right to custody prevails unless the court finds it in the child's best
interests to award custody to the psychological parent to prevent serious harm or detriment to the
welfare of the child.”).
156. 2010 ND 2, 777 N.W.2d 606.
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because the requirement to prevent harm arises from the exceptional
circumstances themselves.157
Also troubling is the constitutional issue of the harm requirement.158
As noted above, a harm requirement has not been decided to be
constitutionally mandatory by the United States Supreme Court.159
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court has determined a finding of
harm or serious detriment is necessary to award custody to a third party
over a fit parent.160 Yet the North Dakota Supreme Court did not require
any type of harm or detriment showing on the part of a guardian when a
parent seeks to terminate the guardianship.161 Thus, despite the harm
requirement being a constitutional mandate in North Dakota,162 a courtappointed guardian does not need to show harm or detriment to the child
that would occur from ending the guardianship.163 Such a harm or
detriment requirement is required under the North Dakota Supreme Court’s
constitutional decisions because the state only has a compelling interest
when the child’s well-being is threatened, and for the termination of
guardianships, it is not now required in North Dakota.164
Finally, the largest need for clarification is the standing of third parties
to bring a claim following recent amendments to North Dakota’s child
custody statutes. Under North Dakota law, standing is a question of the
courts’ jurisdiction to determine the case before it.165 In 2009, the North
Dakota Legislative Assembly repealed and replaced a significant portion of
North Dakota Century Code chapter 14-09.166 Specifically, the Legislative
Assembly changed terminology to be used in child custody proceedings,
defined terms, and repealed the prior “best interests” section, replacing it
with updated factors for a court to consider.167 All of these new definitions
157. See Edwards, ¶ 11, 777 N.W.2d at 610 (“[I]n some cases exceptional circumstances
may require [visitation], in a child's best interests and in order to prevent serious harm or
detriment to the child.”).
158. See discussion supra Part II.C.
159. See discussion supra Part II.C.
160. See In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203, 206 (N.D. 1982).
161. See In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶ 19, 701 N.W.2d 402, 409; see also Hartlieb v. Simes,
2009 ND 205, ¶¶ 25-26, 776 N.W.2d 217, 226 (affirming the district court’s findings that
guardianship should be terminated by only looking at best interest factors with no determination
about whether guardianship should continue to avoid harm to the child).
162. See In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d at 206.
163. See Hartlieb, ¶¶ 20-23, 776 N.W.2d at 224-25.
164. See id., ¶¶ 25-26, 776 N.W.2d at 226; Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶¶ 15-16, 595
N.W.2d 285, 290-91.
165. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Cnty. Farm Bureau, 2004 ND 60, ¶ 11, 676 N.W.2d 752,
757-58.
166. 2009 N.D. Laws 609-22.
167. Id. at 611, 614-16, 621; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (2009).
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specifically contemplate parents being the ones that are contesting custody
and subject to a court’s custody order.168 Significant for third party claims,
the concept formerly known as custody is now known as primary residential
responsibility, which is defined as “a parent with more than fifty percent of
the residential responsibility.”169
Despite using the term “parent” throughout section 14-09-00.1, the
Legislative Assembly failed to define the term “parent” in the section, or
anywhere else in chapter 14-09. Under rules of statutory construction,
words are to be given their plain ordinary meaning unless defined in the
statutes.170 Definitions from other chapters in the North Dakota Century
Code are to be used to construe later undefined terms,171 unless the
Legislative Assembly has made plain the definition only applies to a
particular chapter or title.172 All definitions of “parent” in the North Dakota
Century Code only apply to the chapter where they are located.173 Since
there are no general definitions in the North Dakota Century Code for
“parent” we must presume the Legislative Assembly used the term in its
ordinary meaning.174
The ordinary meaning of parent denotes a child’s biological parents.175
A common definition of parent is “one that begets or brings forth
offspring.”176 This general definition of parent, in terms of natural parents,
fits well with the intent of the drafters of the definitions in North Dakota’s
child custody statute.177 Thus, in adopting the new language defining the
contours of parental rights and responsibilities, it would be presumed the
Legislative Assembly did not include psychological parents in with those
terms.178 Since the new definitions were adopted for child custody in 2009,
there has been no clear answer on whether those definitions exclude

168. See 2009 N.D. Laws 611; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-00.1(2)-(7).
169. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-00.1(6). Residential responsibility “means a parent's
responsibility to provide a home for the child.” Id. § 14-09-00.1(7).
170. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02.
171. Id. § 1-01-09.
172. Edinger v. Governing Auth. of the Stutsman Cnty. Corr. Ctr. & Law Enforcement Ctr.,
2005 ND 79, ¶ 16, 695 N.W.2d 447, 452.
173. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-01, 14-15.1-01, 14-19-01, 30.1-04-14.
174. N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-01-09.
175. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1510 (2002).
176. Id.
177. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, N.D. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE NORTH
DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 209-14 (2008) (stating concerns with custody in divorce
proceedings prompted a review of North Dakota custody law).
178. See id. (mentioning parents, but never a third party claim besides grandparent visitation
claims).
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psychological parents, and it is no longer clear if any third party could bring
a claim for custody.179
There are also constitutional issues with the current law surrounding
third party custody in North Dakota. In Troxel, the plurality, along with
Justices Thomas, Stevens, and Souter held there is a substantive due process
presumption that fit parents act in their child’s best interests, and this
presumption must be rebutted in order for a court to contravene those
wishes.180 Under current North Dakota case law, no special weight is given
to a parent’s decision concerning the custody of his or her child.181 By only
using a preponderance of the evidence standard, no special weight is given
by the court to a parent’s decisions that custody or visitation with a third
party is inappropriate, and therefore, the current case law in North Dakota
violates parent’s rights under Troxel.182
Another constitutional concern present is the interference that litigation
between a parent and a third party over child custody can have on the
parent-child relationship.183 Currently, any third party that can show a
strong bond with a child can petition for custody or visitation in North
Dakota, triggering litigation that will be time consuming and likely require
expert witnesses.184 A parent would likely require expert witness testimony
to rebut a third party’s claim of psychological parent status and custody
with the third party is necessary to prevent harm to the child.185 North
Dakota statutory law also requires parents to pay for custody investigators
and guardians ad litem, if appointed.186 Given the time necessary to defend
a claim from a third party, and the expense that can be incurred in court,

179. Both Edwards and McAllister were decided in the North Dakota Supreme Court in
2010, but the pre-amended custody statute was the law in issue because the cases were tried prior
to the amendments becoming effective. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 1 n.1, 779
N.W.2d 652, 654 n.1; Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶ 3, 777 N.W.2d 606, 607-08.
180. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-70 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); id. at 77-79 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. See In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶¶ 26-28, 701 N.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Kapsner, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. See id.
183. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (plurality opinion) (stating litigating claims themselves can
become so burdensome as to infringe a parent’s constitutional rights); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (same).
184. See Cox v. Cox, 2000 ND 144, ¶ 23, 613 N.W.2d 516, 522 (affirming award of custody
to natural father, in part, based on the lack of expert testimony showing a psychological parent
bond between child and third parties). While Cox, involved a lack of expert testimony, a parent
who faces adverse expert witness testimony will run a serious risk of not finding his or her own
expert to rebut that testimony. See Clark v. Clark, 2006 ND 182, ¶¶ 6-10, 20, 721 N.W.2d 6, 1011, 14 (affirming, in a divorce case, both the exclusion of father’s expert witnesses from trial,
because of late disclosure, and that there was sufficient evidence in record for changing custody).
185. See Cox, ¶ 23, 613 N.W.2d at 522.
186. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06.3(4), 14-09-06.4 (2009).
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attorney, expert witness, custody investigator, and guardian ad litem fees, a
parent might be reluctant to assert his or her parental rights.187 As a
majority of Justices said in Troxel, the burden of preserving parental rights
in litigation might be a constitutional violation.188 It may well prompt a
parent to settle, and allow custody or visitation to be granted to a third
party, when the parent otherwise would not have agreed.189
B. OTHER STATES’ STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Due to the high degree of policy choice inherent in delineating parental
rights and the questionable constitutionality of infringing upon them, many
state legislatures have chosen to proscribe by statute the availability of third
party custody claims.190 Many courts have also chosen to not recognize a
third party claim to custody absent an authorizing statute.191 Of the states
that have adopted legislation on the topic, two stand out.
1.

Minnesota’s Third Party Custody Statute

In 2002, the Minnesota Legislature enacted statutory provisions to
regulate the types of third parties who can petition for custody and
visitation, along with what procedures they must follow to be granted an
award.192 Minnesota law distinguishes between third parties who have been
providing care for a child in that person’s home without a parent present,
called de facto parents,193 and all other third parties who might be interested
in the child’s custody.194 A de facto parent must show he or she has been
the primary caretaker for the child in the person’s home for two years, and
the parent has not had meaningful contact with the child for a significant
amount of time.195 An interested person is one who can show that the
parent has neglected the child to an extent the child will be harmed if living
with his or her parent, or presence of physical or emotional harm to the
187. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (plurality opinion); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(same).
188. Id. at 75; id. at 101.
189. See id. at 75; id. at 101. In North Dakota this danger is all the more real, as there is
often required mediation as a condition of going to trial in family law cases. See N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 14-09.1; N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER 17 (2011).
190. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 33, 779 N.W.2d 652, 665 (Crothers,
J., concurring) (surveying authority).
191. See id. ¶ 34, 779 N.W.2d at 665-66.
192. 2002 Minn. Laws 429-36, 444. The sections concerning voluntary placement with a
third party by a parent and petitions for visitation were not newly adopted. Id. 444.
193. MINN. STAT. § 257C.01, subdivs. 2-3 (2012).
194. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 7.
195. Id. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2(a)(1)-(2). The two years must have elapsed with the child in
the de facto parent’s care before filing any petition for custody. Id. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2(b).
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child trumps preserving the parent-child relationship.196 If the sworn
petition in the action is not supported by enough factual allegations made
by the de facto custodian or interested party, the court must dismiss the
action prior to holding an evidentiary hearing.197 Both the de facto
custodian and the interested person must show their status by clear and
convincing evidence at trial to be granted custody.198 The status of a nongrandparent seeking visitation in Minnesota must also be established by
clear and convincing evidence.199 Despite the higher burden for showing
status, the preponderance of the evidence is only required of the de facto
custodian or interested party to show the best interests of the child would be
served by placing custody of the child with them.200
2.

California’s Third Party Custody Statute

Like Minnesota, in 2002, the California Legislature significantly
amended its prior third-party custody statute to define the situations when a
third party can be granted custody over a parent.201 Like Minnesota,
California requires a parent be awarded custody over a nonparent unless
harm or detriment to the child from being placed with the parent would
result.202 This harm must be shown by the third party, by clear and
convincing evidence.203 However, if the third party can show by a
preponderance of the evidence the child has been living with the third party
for a substantial time in a parental role, then there is a rebuttable
presumption that custody being granted to the parent would be harmful.204
There is no definite time period required, as there is in Minnesota.205 The

196. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 7(a)(1)(i)-(iii).
197. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 2; In re M.R.P.-C., 794 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
198. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03, subdiv. 6(a)(1), subdiv. 7(a)(1).
199. Id. § 257C.08, subdiv. 4; SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 824 (Minn. 2007).
SooHoo also held that the placement on the parent to show that any visitation would interfere with
the parent-child relationship is unconstitutional because it does not give special weight to a fit
parent’s decision on visitation. 731 N.W.2d at 824.
200. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03, subdiv. 6(a)(2), subdiv. 7(a)(2).
201. 2002 Cal. Stat. 7177. There were amendments in 2006 as well that clarified how the
law applied to Indian children. 2006 Cal. Stat. 6541-42.
202. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a) (Deering Supp. 2012).
203. Id. § 3041(b).
204. Id. § 3041(c)-(d). One California court has stated that the presumption is not
inconsistent with the clear and convincing evidence standard because the presumed fact is that
clear and convincing evidence exists that placement with the parent would be a detriment to the
child, and is not an elimination of the clear and convincing evidence standard. H.S. v. N.S., 93
Cal. Rptr. 3d 470, 476 (Ct. App. 2009).
205. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(c), with MINN. STAT. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2.
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parent can rebut the presumption by showing that harm would not result, by
a preponderance of the evidence.206
C. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES
The American Law Institute developed principles to apply to family
law, including divorce, support, and child custody and visitation, through
the 1990s, with the promulgation of the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION on May 16, 2000.207 The PRINCIPLES define third
parties, with regard to child custody, as de facto parents.208 The PRINCIPLES
also delineate how custody should be apportioned among parents as a
default.209 The relative time given to custody petitioners generally follows
the percentage of time that a parent spent caring for the child.210 For
disputes between legal parents and de facto parents, the PRINCIPLES favor a
fit parent unless that fit parent has not been providing for the child, or the
child would be harmed by favoring the parent.211 There is no indication
what burden of proof is required to show a person is a de facto parent, or
that placing the child with a parent is not presumed.212 The definitions and
scheme embodied in the PRINCIPLES does not comport with the current
articulations of natural parents’ constitutional rights.213 Due to this
deficiency, the PRINCIPLES would not really provide a good stepping stone
for a statutory solution in North Dakota.214 While the recognition that daily
tasks concerning a child are important,215 the fulfillment of only a majority
of these functions should not lead to a presumption of custody for a third
party, but rather the quality of the relationship is what matters.216

206. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(d). The use of the presumption by the Legislature did not
violate the parent’s constitutional due process rights. H.S., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 476-77.
207. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, at xiii-xiv (2002).
208. Id. § 2.03(1)(c).
209. Id. § 2.08(1).
210. Id. Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson critiques the Principles on the ground that the
caretaking and de facto parent requirements are so lax and do not give proper weight to parents,
primarily mothers. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law
Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1118-20 (2010). Professor
Wilson argues that the Principles actually make it easier for child molesters to gain custodial
rights to their victims and are rewarded in a third party custody action based on their behaviors
with the victims that groom the child for the abuse. Id.
211. AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, § 2.18.
212. See id.
213. David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of
Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1085-88 (2001).
214. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
215. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, §§ 2.03(5), 2.08(1).
216. See Wilson, supra note 210, at 1135.
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D. NORTH DAKOTA’S POSSIBLE SOLUTION
The North Dakota Legislative Assembly should endorse a view longespoused in North Dakota, that the pursuit of happiness as guaranteed in the
North Dakota Constitution,217 includes a right of parents to be free from
unwarranted governmental interference in their families.218 In recognition
of this place of parental rights, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly
should adopt legislation that provides standing to third party petitioners.219
The Legislative Assembly also needs to create a process to prevent parents
from being drawn into lengthy litigation, and thereby infringe their parental
rights.220 Finally, the Legislative Assembly should require a third party to
bear the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is, both a proper person to have custody, and that custody with the third
party is required to prevent harm or serious detriment to the child. For any
visitation granted to a third party, the third party should be required to show
that visitation will not interfere with the parent-child relationship.
1.

North Dakota’s Standing Solution by Defining Parenthood for
Child Custody Actions

As custody is currently defined in North Dakota, a parent-child
relationship is assumed.221 One solution to grant standing to a third party to
seek custody would be to define the term “parent” for the purposes of child
custody.222 Thus, by defining parent in a manner that includes third parties
who can appropriately meet the other requirements of a newly adopted
statute, they would thereby have standing to bring a claim for custody.223 It
would also give context and meaning to the frequent use of the term
“parent” throughout North Dakota Century Code chapter 14-09.224
2.

The Need to Insulate Parents from Marginal
Third Party Claims

As a majority of Justices recognized in Troxel, the litigation of a claim
can pose a large obstacle, even a constitutional concern, for a parent, and
217. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
218. Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, ¶ 10, 595 N.W.2d 285, 289 (citing State v. Cromwell, 9
N.W.2d 914, 919 (N.D. 1943)).
219. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
220. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
221. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
222. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, § 2.03(1) (stating that for the purposes of the child
custody section of the Principles the definition of parent includes a de facto parent).
223. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
224. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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could lead to parents feeling coerced by their circumstances to permit their
parental rights to be invaded where they otherwise would not have done
so.225 In light of this concern, a procedure should be adopted to weed out
non-meritorious third party custody claims early in litigation.226 Minnesota
requires all third party petitions for custody to be sworn to by the party
bringing the action, and the case must be dismissed if insufficient facts are
pled to show that a third party fits the statutory definitions of persons with
standing to pursue the claim.227 All of these facts are taken as true to
determine this status.228
North Dakota should adopt a requirement similar to Minnesota’s
verified petition. However, given the special constitutional issue at stake,
instead of presuming the allegations in an affidavit are true, North Dakota
should require the third party petitioner to schedule a hearing where crossexamination is permitted to determine the claims of the third party. This
should be done early enough in the litigation, perhaps after sixty days
following commencement of the suit, and prior to conducting significant
discovery, so that neither the parents or the petitioners will have expended
large amounts of time and money.229 The hearing should be required prior
to any referral to a mediation program or appointment by the court of a
guardian ad litem or parenting investigator.230
3.

The Third Party Should Need to Prove His or Her Case by
Clear and Convincing Evidence

Given the parental rights at stake, North Dakota should make a third
party seeking custody over the objection of a parent a heavy burden. Many
legislatures and several courts have found a clear and convincing evidence
standard protects children and respects parents’ fundamental rights.231
North Dakota should follow suit and ensure parental rights are upheld
unless it is clearly shown there is a greater harm to the child.

225. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (plurality opinion) (stating litigating claims
themselves can become so burdensome as to infringe a parent’s constitutional rights); id. at 101
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same).
226. See In re M.R.P.-C., 794 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. This procedure is already common in family law cases in North Dakota, and would not
require significant adjustment in the practice of the bench and bar. See N.D. CT. R. 8.3 (2011).
230. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-09-06.3(1), 14-09-06.4 (2009) (permitting court to appoint
custody investigator and guardian ad litem, at either request of a party or on its own motion).
231. See discussion supra Parts IV.B.
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Minnesota requires a third party to show the child’s best interests
would be served by only a preponderance of the evidence.232 California
does not have a best interest requirement, rather couching the justification
for placing the child with the third party in terms of harm prevention.233
California also requires a prevention of harm to the child to be shown by
clear and convincing evidence.234
North Dakota should follow the lead of California and be explicit that
the third party must show by clear and convincing evidence that placement
of the child with the child’s parent would be a detriment to the child. To
ensure the third party is an appropriate person to have custody, North
Dakota should follow Minnesota’s lead and require a showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the third party has a proper relationship with the
child.235 However, North Dakota should not apply the interested party
status as defined in Minnesota, as it only collapses the harm requirement.236
Rather, the de facto parent definition properly fits with a current conception
of who is currently entitled to bring an action in North Dakota.237 In order
to give both courts and litigants clear guidance about which third parties
can bring an action,238 the specific time frames used by Minnesota in
defining a de facto parent should be adopted, as well.239 Finally, having
clear guidance about when a parent has not taken an appropriate role in the
care of his or her children, as embodied in the list of caregiving tasks and
parenting task as defined in the Principles,240 would likewise give clear
guidance on what things a parent needs to take care of in order to avoid a
third party custody claim.
4.

A Third Party Granted Only Visitation Must Show
that Visitation Will Not Interfere with
the Parent-Child Relationship

Currently, the only third parties that are statutorily entitled to bring an
action for visitation in North Dakota are grandparents and great-

232. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03, subdiv. 6(a)(2), subdiv. 7(a)(2) (2012).
233. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041(a) (Deering Supp. 2012).
234. Id.
235. MINN. STAT. § 257C.03 subdiv. 6(a)(1), subdiv. 7(a)(1).
236. Id. § 257C.03, subdiv. 7(a)(1).
237. See McAllister v. McAllister, 20100 ND 40, ¶¶ 14-15, 779 N.W.2d 652, 658 (defining
“psychological parent”); In re Barros, 2005 ND 122, ¶ 18, 701 N.W.2d 402, 408-09.
238. See McAllister, ¶ 37, 779 N.W.2d at 666 (Crothers, J., dissenting) (noting development
of third party claims through case law does not give parties, courts, or attorneys much guidance on
the subject).
239. MINN. STAT. § 257C.01, subdiv. 2(a)-(c).
240. AM. LAW INST., supra note 207, § 2.03(5)-(6).
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grandparents.241 Since the Legislative Assembly has chosen to allow
grandparents and great-grandparents this right only on a preponderance of
the evidence, a similar right for other third parties to request visitation
should be allowed. As visitation is a lesser intrusion into the parent-child
relationship than custody, having only a preponderance of the evidence
standard does not necessarily implicate the same constitutional concerns as
when custody is at issue.242 Non-grandparent third parties should still be
required to prove their relationship with the child by clear and convincing
evidence, however. The grandparental statute only requires that the best
interest analysis show that visitation should apply, and as such, the same
standard should apply to those third parties that can show a proper
relationship to the child.
One critique leveled at the PRINCIPLES, which could grant significant
visitation rights with third parties, is that a third party receiving visitation
would not be required to pay any kind of child support.243 Normally, a
parent has both rights and responsibilities to a child, but under the
PRINCIPLES, and possibly under current North Dakota law, third parties
granted visitation have no responsibility to provide support to the child.244
Currently, grandparents are not subject to pay child support for their
grandchildren when granted visitation, and it is not clear if third parties
would be obligated to pay child support.245 Stepparents are required to
support their stepchildren while a part of the stepparent’s family,246 but this
obligation ceases when the stepparent and parent divorce.247 North Dakota
should recognize if third parties wish to gain rights to a child, they should
also bear responsibilities to that child. At a minimum, the third party, or
grandparent for that matter, should be required to bear a majority of the
expenses incurred in exercising visitation.248

241. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2009).
242. See Edwards v. Edwards, 2010 ND 2, ¶ 8, 777 N.W.2d 606, 609.
243. Wilson, supra note 210, at 1114-15. Professor Wilson argues that requiring third
parties to be at risk of paying child support if granted visitation serves an important screening
process to ensure that only sufficiently invested third parties seek custody or visitation. Id. at
1114 n.70.
244. Id. at 1114-15; McAllister, ¶¶ 3, 8-10, 779 N.W.2d 652, 655-57.
245. See Johnson v. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, ¶¶ 30-32, 52, 617 N.W.2d 97, 107-08, 111-12
(holding that only parents who equitably adopt a child is required to pay child support). There is
not really a question that a parent would have to pay child support to a third party. N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-09.10(12).
246. N.D. CENT CODE § 14-09-09.
247. See Johnson, ¶ 31, 617 N.W.2d at 107.
248. See N.D. ADMIN CODE § 74-02-04.1-09(2)(j) (2011) (allowing deviation from child
support guideline amount for obligor who is required to bear all the expenses of court ordered
parenting time).
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V. CONCLUSION
North Dakota cases have carved out a unique place for psychological
parents to gain custody of children they have neither legally adopted or
parented in the biological sense.249 Given the nature of creating policy
through case law, parents and third parties who would seek custody have
many unanswered questions.250 Considering the further complication in the
United States Supreme Court’s language articulating parental rights, the
North Dakota Legislative Assembly should enact legislation to give clear
guidance to judges, parents, and third party caregivers about who can
petition for custody and what that person would have to prove.251 This
guidance will hopefully lead to clearer court decisions and decreased
litigation, all in the best interests of North Dakota’s children.
John D. Schroeder*

249. See discussion supra Part III.B.
250. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶¶ 36-37, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, J.,
concurring).
251. Id.; see discussion supra Part II.C.
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